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Articles
Rethinking the Role of the Written Description
Requirement in Claim Construction:
Whatever Happened to “Possession is Nine-Tenths
of the Law?”
Douglas R. Nemec* & Emily J. Zelenock**
INTRODUCTION
Patent law, once regarded as an arcane discipline relevant
only to direct participants in the patent system – namely,
patent lawyers and agents, inventors and owners, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the courts –
has recently captured the attention and interest of the public.
In the past few years, patent law has become headline news,
accompanied by an increased public perception that overly
broad patents are being granted by the PTO and unjustly
enforced against companies that have commercialized valuable
products and services, thereby stifling innovation and harming
consumers. 1
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The dramatic and unprecedented technological revolution
of the past decade may be largely responsible for the
heightened public awareness of patents and their potential
impact on the public. Since the mid-1990s, the Internet has
risen from its nascent stages and completely altered the
manner, process, and scope of doing business. The technology
boom has caused a spike in the overall number of Internetrelated patent applications filed with the PTO, particularly
applications that cover business methods or software. 2 Several
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the New York office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Ms.
Zelenock concentrates her practice on patent litigation and related counseling.
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pharmaceuticals, computer software, telecommunications, mechanical devices,
and business methods. Ms. Zelenock has represented clients during various
phases of litigation in state and federal court, and has been involved in cases
that have settled through litigation and the processes of alternative dispute
resolution.
1. In some instances, “madcap patents, such as patents for “protecting a
method of painting by dipping a baby’s bottom into paint or a system for
keeping track of people queuing for the bathroom” have grabbed headlines.
See, e.g., Maggie Shiels, Technology Industry Hits Out at Patent ‘Trolls’, BBC
News (June, 2, 2004) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission’s view that
“[s]uch patents, while humorous, clearly show both how broken the American
patent system and how lax standards are hurting innovation when it comes to
business[.]”). In other instances, patent litigations involving widely used
products or services have grabbed the public’s attention because of the concern
that a finding of infringement in such cases will affect consumers who use
such products or services. See infra notes 3 and 4 (discussing the recent
litigations involving eBay and Blackberry services). Moreover, patent law has
received national attention due to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Microsoft, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4744 (April 30, 2007)
(reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) does not
extend to foreign duplication of software); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2007
U.S. LEXIS 4745 (April 30, 2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “teachingsuggestion-motivation” test for determining when a patent is invalid for
obviousness because it was too narrow and rigid); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that a patent licensee
is not required, insofar as U.S. Const. Art. III is concerned, to break or
terminate its license agreement with the patent holder before seeking a
declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent was invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed).
2. In 1998, the Federal Circuit clarified that software is patentable when
it is applied in such a way that yields a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 U.S. 851 (1999) (quoting In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In addition, the State Street Court
rejected what had become known as the “business method” exception to
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high profile cases involving business method and software
patents have contributed to a widely held belief that, at best,
these types of patents are often overly broad as drafted and, at
worst, have a deleterious impact on the marketplace. In
particular, cases involving the widely used BlackBerry 3 device
and eBay’s 4 popular online auction site showed consumers the
patentability, stating that “[w]hether the claims are directed to subject matter
within [35 U.S.C. § 101] should not turn on whether the claimed subject
matter does ‘business’ instead of something else.” Id. at 1377. The PTO
responded to the State Street decision by creating a new classification for
patent applications for so-called business methods, which “encompasses
machines and their corresponding methods for performing data processing or
calculation operations, where the machine or method is utilized in the 1)
practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or 2) processing of
financial data, or 3) determination of the charge for goods or services.” U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO White Paper, AUTOMATED
FINANCIAL OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS
METHODS) 5 (defining Class 705). In the first year following the State Street
decision, patent filings for software/Internet business methods more than
doubled. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Business Methods:
Class
705
Application
Filing
and
Patents
Issued
Data,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/applicationfiling.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2007).
3. In 2001, NTP sued Research In Motion (“RIM”) alleging that RIM’s
BlackBerry service infringed its business method patents broadly directed to
wireless e-mail. NTP won the case and was granted an injunction barring
RIM from selling its BlackBerry device and service in the United States. NTP,
Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26837, at *5 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 5, 2003). The injunction was stayed pending RIM’s appeals. Id. The
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of patent infringement,
despite RIM’s claim that it was not infringing NTP’s patents because a critical
step of the BlackBerry service was not located in the United States. NTP, Inc.
v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). RIM filed a
petition for certiorari on this issue, which the Supreme Court rejected in early
2006. Research In Motion, Ltd. v. NTP, Inc., 126 U.S. 1174 (2006). The
BlackBerry case made headlines largely because of its potential to impact the
public – had the injunction been imposed, it would have affected the
approximately 4.3 million BlackBerry customers in the United States. See
Grace Wong, Setback for BlackBerry Maker, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/23/technology/rim/index.htm. BlackBerry users
breathed a collective sigh of relief when the parties ultimately settled for
$612.5 million. See Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million
Mar.
3,
2006,
Settlement,
CNNMONEY.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/index.htm.
4. In 2001, a small company called MercExchange sued eBay, alleging
that eBay’s “Buy It Now” feature (which allows buyers to forgo the auction and
buy an item for a set price) infringed two of MercExchange’s business method
patents. In 2003, eBay was found to have infringed the patents, but the
district court did not impose an injunction, noting that MercExchange did not
practice the patents and was willing to license. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay,
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003). On appeal, the Federal Circuit
overturned the decision to not impose the injunction and held that, absent
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potential for patent litigation to adversely affect their daily
lives.
Overly broad patents are a valid source of concern, as they
undermine the quid pro quo bargain underlying the patent
system, whereby the patentee agrees to publicly disclose what
it is that he claims to have invented in exchange for exclusive
rights to exploit the invention. 5 The government’s patent grant
is intended to extend only to the inventive subject matter that
the patentee has disclosed – simply put, a patentee is not
entitled to a patent for that which it did not invent and disclose
to the public in the patent document. 6 Yet, if patent claims are
afforded overly broad constructions without regard to whether
the patentee has complied with its statutory disclosure
obligations, the patentee’s patent coverage may exceed what
was actually invented and disclosed.
The patentee’s written description defines the scope of the
invention and, therefore, is critical in determining whether the
patentee has a right to exclude others from exploiting the full
breadth of the claims as written, and as the patentee proposes
that they be construed. The written description requirement,
codified in the first paragraph of title 35, section 112 of the U.S.
Code, demands that the patent “contain a written description of
the invention . . . in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact terms.” 7
“exceptional circumstances,” an injunction must follow a finding of
infringement. 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10220 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2006). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and in 2006 held that an injunction does not automatically
follow from a finding of infringement, but that an injunction should not be
denied simply because the patentee does not practice the patented invention.
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). The Supreme Court remanded the case for further
consideration using the traditional four-factor test for determining whether an
injunction should be imposed. Id. at 1841. Like the BlackBerry case, this case
drew headlines because of its potential to impact on the millions of people who
use eBay’s online auction site daily. See, e.g., Nicholas Varchaver, eBay Gets
Mar.
28,
2006,
the
Blackberry
Treatment,
CNNMONEY.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/28/technology/ebay_fortune/index.htm.
5. The term “patentee” as used in this article collectively refers to any
party with rights to an invention covered by a patent, including inventors and
patent assignees.
6. Lizardtech, Inc., v. Earth Res. Mapping. Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Lourie, J., concurring) ("The whole purpose of a patent
specification is to disclose one’s invention to the public. It is the quid pro quo
for the grant of the period of exclusivity. The need to tell the public what the
invention is, in addition to how to make and use it, is self-evident. One should
not be able to obtain a patent on what one has not disclosed to the public.").
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000).
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This conclusory statutory language begs the question of what
the patentee must do to fulfill the written description
requirement. While the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has
indicated that the “purpose of the description requirement is ‘to
ensure that the inventor had possession’” of the invention, the
concept of possession often gets lost in the claim construction
shuffle. 8
Under current canons of claim construction, the analysis
focuses on the so-called “ordinary meaning” of a patent claim
term to a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, rather
than what the patentee actually conceived, reduced to practice,
and disclosed to the public. The system provides an incentive
for patentees to draft claims that encompass more subject
matter than what they actually possessed at the time of filing,
either by adding a specific limitation that is unsupported by the
written description, or by using overly broad claim language
when, in fact, the original disclosure describes something much
narrower. The patentee’s overly broad construction will often
prevail, unless the alleged infringer can prove “an intentional
disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope,” or that patentee used
a “special definition . . . that differs from the meaning [a claim
This standard further
term] would otherwise possess.” 9
incentivizes patentees to be vague in describing their invention,
lest their words be interpreted to be a “clear disavowal” or
“special definition[.]” 10 Thus, in all but these most obvious
cases, the alleged infringer is left to fight an uphill battle to
prove that the patentee’s written description does not support
the claim construction that the patentee has proposed.
Placing such a heavy burden on the alleged infringer is
misguided. The patentee’s right to exclude extends only to the
invention that has been described in “full, clear, concise, and
exact terms.” 11 Stated differently, others are entitled – indeed,
encouraged – to participate in conduct that falls outside the

8. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re
Edwards, 568 F. 2d 1349, 1351-52 (C.C.P.A. 1978)), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1141
(1999); In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 592 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“[T]he ‘essential
goal’ of the description of the invention requirement is to clearly convey the
information that an applicant has invented the subject matter which is
claimed”), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1964 (1978).
9. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
10. Id.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000).
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scope of what has been fully, clearly, concisely, and exactly
defined. A claim construction system that allows a patentee to
benefit from a vague, overly broad, or otherwise poorly drafted
written description threatens to destabilize the patent system
by giving the patentee more than it bargained for.
This Article proposes that this risk could be diminished by
a moderate shift in the application of the written description
requirement. Rather than continuing to perpetuate the fallacy
that claim construction and compliance with the written
description requirement are separate inquiries, courts should
evaluate written description compliance in connection with
claim construction. Specifically, courts should place the initial
burden on the patentee – the party typically urging the broader
claim construction – to demonstrate that the invention’s
written description supports the patentee’s proposed claim
construction. This approach would bring the scope of the
patentee’s rights into better alignment with what the patentee
actually invented – something that would bring much needed
clarity and predictability to the patent system. As Judge
Lourie of the Federal Circuit observed in a 2006 opinion, “[o]ne
does not receive entitlement to a period of exclusivity for what
one has not disclosed to the public.” 12 Judge Newman recently
expressed a similar sentiment: “We should speak en banc to
clarify that it is appropriate, and necessary, to look at what has
in fact been invented, prosecuted, and patented, and construe
the claims accordingly.” 13
Part I of this Article explores the constitutional and
statutory origins of the patent system, and demonstrates that
requiring the patentee to show compliance with the written
description requirement is consistent with the historical
purpose for the patent system. Part II traces the role of the
written description in claim construction jurisprudence before
and after the Federal Circuit’s 2005 en banc decision in Phillips
v. AWH Corp., 14 which upheld the primacy of the patent
specification as “the single best guide to the meaning of a

12. Lizardtech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring).
13. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1042
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453,
75 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007).
14. 415 F.3d 1303, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1332 (2006).
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disputed term.” 15 In this section, this Article argues that
requiring the patentee to establish that the specification
provides written support for its proposed construction of the
claims takes the logic of Phillips one step further, and increases
the likelihood that the patent scope will not exceed the
invention that the patentee possessed and disclosed to the
public at the time of filing. Indeed, this approach has already
been utilized (and shown to be effective) in cases where the
patentee’s written description contains a “clear disavowal of
claim scope” or a narrow definition that readily undermines the
patentee’s proposal for a broad construction. Thus, from an
analytical standpoint, this approach is not a radical departure
from what is already done in these clear cases. Such an
approach will have particular utility, however, in more difficult,
“close call” patent disputes, because it will place the burden on
the patentee to satisfy the court that there is written
description support for the subject matter covered by its
proposed construction. Part III provides guidance on how this
approach could be integrated with existing claim construction
processes without the need for substantive changes in the law.
In particular, courts could consider written description
compliance in conjunction with claim construction without
running afoul of the presumption of validity.
The Article concludes by explaining how this proposal, if
implemented, would further the goals of the patent system
without compromising its values or necessitating massive
reform. Requiring the patentee to demonstrate compliance
with the written description requirement would enhance the
likelihood that the patent claims would match the scope of
what the patentee actually invented. This approach would also
promote efficiency and fairness during claim construction by
placing the burden on the patentee, the party best positioned to
know what it possessed at the time of filing, and who has an
incentive to show that such possession is supported by the
written description. Finally, this approach would further
interests outside of the claim construction context as well. For
example, incentivizing patentees to align their claims to their
invention as described in the specification would lead to greater
precision in patent draftsmanship, which would particularly

15. Id. at 1315 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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benefit the realm of software and business method patents. 16
Likewise, the certainty that compliance with the written
description requirement will be scrutinized at the claim
construction stage may discourage patentees from pursuing
dubious claims of infringement.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT
OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
The constitutional and statutory basis for a patent grant in
the United States is based on a quid pro quo exchange between
a patentee and the government: the patentee fully discloses its
invention to the public in exchange for exclusive rights to the
invention for a limited time period. 17 This bargain, at least in
theory, is pro-competitive – the patentee benefits by receiving a
legal grant of “monopoly power,” 18 which creates an incentive

16. Claim construction “can only be determined . . . with a full
understanding of what the inventors actually invented . . . . The construction
that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the
patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct
construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243,
1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17. U.S. patents (other than design patents) issuing after June 8, 1995
have a twenty year term, beginning on the date on which the patent issues
and ending twenty years from the earliest filing date of the patent application.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). U.S. patents (other than design patents) that
were already in force as of June 8, 1995, or that issued on an application that
was filed before June 8, 1995, have a term that is the greater of the “twentyyear term” or seventeen years from the patent grant. Id. § 154(c). Design
patents have a fourteen-year term from the patent grant. Id. § 173(c).
18. As used herein, references to patent “monopoly” and patentee
“monopoly power” refer generally to the “bundle of rights” that a patent
confers upon a patentee, most notably the exclusive rights to the invention
disclosed in the patent and the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., 52 F.3d
1026, 1031-32 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The proprietary rights granted by any patent
are the rights to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention in
the United States.”) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154, which provides: “Every patent
shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States.”). Thus,
references to “monopoly” in this Article do not refer to an economic “monopoly”
within a strict antitrust definition. This is because “[p]atent rights are not
legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of the word. Not every patent is a
monopoly, and not every patent confers market power.” See FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003) at 2 n.8, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (citing ROBERT L. HARMON,
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.4(b) at 21 (5th ed. 2001)).
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for the patentee to exploit the invention in the marketplace. In
turn, the public benefits by receiving a detailed disclosure of a
new invention, which can be used freely upon expiration of the
patent, and which immediately enriches the public knowledge
so as to spur further innovation. 19
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS FOR PATENTEE MONOPOLY POWER
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 20
While the language does not provide great detail, it does make
it clear that the “exclusive right” should extend only for
“limited times,” and only to subject matter that was the
inventor’s discovery. As the Supreme Court has explained:
The patent laws “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by
rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly. U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. The monopoly is a property right; and like any property
right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to
promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in
innovation. A patent holder should know what he owns, and the
public should know what he does not. For this reason, the patent
laws require inventors to describe their work in “full, clear, concise,
and exact terms,” 35 U.S.C. § 112 as part of the delicate balance the
law attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise
of the law to bring the invention forth, and the public, which should
be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond
the inventor’s exclusive rights. 21

B. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
Since the first patent law was enacted in 1790, Congress
has acted numerous times in an effort to effectuate the quid pro
quo contemplated by our Founding Fathers. The Patent Act of
19. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (“The basic
quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting
a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
234 F.3d 558, 621 (Fed. Cir. 2000),(en banc) (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[T]he patent also is of value to the public because such
disclosures will stimulate others to add to the sum of human knowledge
through the creation of other inventions utilizing the lessons learned by the
patentee”), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
20. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. Festo, 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)).
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1790 (the 1790 Act) 22 did not require patent claim(s), but did
require the patent to include a written description of the
invention. Specifically, the 1790 Act required the inventor to:
[D]eliver . . .
a specification in writing, containing a
description . . . of [the invention] . . . which specification shall
be so particular . . . as not only to distinguish the invention . . .
but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the
art . . . to make, construct or use the same . . . . 23
Thus, the requirement for an adequate written description
of the invention was part of the patent laws even before the
inclusion of a patent claim was recognized or required.
The 1790 Act further required a patentee to demonstrate
its possession over particular subject matter by submitting a
“working model” of its invention with the patent application.
This approach effectively limited the invention to what was
actually reduced to practice, as shown in the working model.
While a working model simplified the process of determining
the invention literally “possessed” by the patentee, it effectively
limited the patentee’s invention to one embodiment.
The patent laws were amended in 1793 to require, inter
alia, an inventor to:
[D]eliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of
using, or process of compounding the same, in such full, clear, and
exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before
known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science . . . to
make, compound, and use the same. 24

This language has been interpreted to impose two distinct
requirements – an enablement requirement (“to enable artisans
to make and use it”), and a written description requirement,
which would “put the public in possession of what the party
claims as his own invention . . . and to protect the public from
an inventor ‘pretending that his invention is more than what it
really is.’” 25 Like its predecessor act, the Patent Act of 1793 did
not require the patent to include a claim.
The Patent Act of 1836 (“the 1836 Act”) 26 included a
substantially similar written description requirement, but also
22. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 321.
23. Id. § 2, Stat. at 110.
24. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3 1 Stat. 318, 321 (emphasis added).
25. In re Barker, 559 F.2d at 588, 592 n. 4(C.C.P.A. 1977) (quoting Evans
v. Waton, 20 U.S. 161 (1822)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
26. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
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included the first iteration of claim practice:
[B]efore any inventor . . . receive[s] a patent . . . he shall deliver a
written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner
and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the
same, in such full, clear, and exact terms . . . as to enable any person
skilled in the art or science . . . to make, construct, compound, and
use the same; and in case of any machine, he shall fully explain the
principle and the several modes in which he has contemplated the
application of that principle or character by which it may be
distinguished from other inventions; and shall particularly specify
and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims
as his own invention or discovery. 27

The requirements for a “full, clear, and exact” description
of the invention, and a specification of the “part, improvement,
or combination, which he claims as his . . . invention” served
the same purpose as a working model – to fulfill the patentee’s
quid pro quo of public disclosure. 28 Whereas a working model
demonstrated an actual reduction to practice of the invention,
these requirements were tantamount to a constructive
reduction to practice. Both served to place the public on notice
of the patentee’s invention and corresponding right to exclude.
Accordingly, this language paved the way for Congress to drop
the working model requirement altogether.
The working model requirement was officially dropped in
the Patent Act of 1870 (“the 1870 Act”). 29 The 1870 Act
included a written description provision substantially similar to
the language of the 1836 Act:
[B]efore any inventor . . . shall receive a patent for his invention . . .
he shall file in the patent office a written description of the same, and
of the manner and process of making, constructing, compounding, and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains . . . to make,
construct, compound, and use the same, and . . . he shall explain . . .
the best mode in which he has contemplated applying that principle
so as to distinguish it from other inventions . . . and he shall
particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or
combination which he claims as his invention . . . and said
specification and claim shall be signed by the inventor and attested
by two witnesses. 30

The main differences between this provision and the
comparable provision in the 1836 Act is the requirement to
“point out and distinctly claim” the invention, and the reference
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. § 6, 5 Stat. at 119 (emphasis added).
Id.
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 201.
Id. § 26, 16 Stat. at 201 (emphasis added).
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to “said specification and claim.” This language represents the
first unequivocal signal in patent law showing that a claim is to
be considered its own component of the patent, separate and
distinct from the specification. It was not until 1952, however,
that the patent laws were revised and codified into substantially their present
form, expressly requiring “at least one claim” in addition to a
written description of the invention. 31
Although the Patent Act of 1952 (“the 1952 Act” or “the
Patent Statute”) constituted a comprehensive revision to the
patent laws, the 1836 and 1870 Acts’ language regarding
written description carried over to the 1952 Act in substantially
similar form. 32 Codified in the first paragraph of title 35,
section 112 of the U.S. Code, the written description
requirement of the Patent Statute provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 33

31. Although the Patent Statute has remained substantially the same
since 1952, that may change soon. On April 18, 2007, the Patent Reform Act
of 2007 (“2007 Patent Bill”) was introduced to Congress. H.R. 1908, S. 1145,
110th Cong. (2007). This bill broadly resembles the the Patent Reform Act of
2005 (“2005 Patent Bill”), which was introduced to Congress on June 8, 2005.
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). Upon introduction to Congress, the 2005
Patent Bill was hailed as the “most comprehensive change to U.S. patent law
since Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act.” Congressman Lamar Smith,
Opening Statement to the Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2795, the “Patent Act
of 2005,” June 9, 2005. These proposed reforms include, inter alia, changing
the “first to invent” priority system to a “first to file” system, expanding prior
user rights, allowing pre-issuance protests by third parties, expanding the use
of post-issuance reexamination and opposition proceedings, eliminating the
best mode requirement, and modifying the doctrines of willful infringement
and inequitable conduct. Id. Despite the radical measures proposed in H.R.
2795, there is no proposed change that would alter the written description
requirement.
32. Note that the current language of Section 112 is the result of the 1975
amendments to the 1952 Act. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §
7.02[4] (2005).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000) (emphasis added). This paragraph has
been interpreted to encompass three distinct, but related, requirements. As
the Federal Circuit has explained:
Three separate requirements are contained in [§ 112, ¶ 1]: (1) ‘the
specification shall contain a written description of the invention’; (2)
“the specification shall contain a written description . . . of the
manner and process of making and using it [i.e., the invention] in
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The Patent Statute adopts the “particularly point out and
distinctly claim” language of the 1870 Act, and further requires
that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 34
With this statutory development in mind, the Federal
Circuit in Phillips observed that:
[The] “bedrock principle” of patent law that “the claims of a patent
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
exclude” . . . has been recognized since at least 1836, when Congress
first required that the specification include a portion in which the
inventor “shall particularly specify and point out the part,
improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention
or discovery.” 35

It is important to note, however, that the 1836 Act did not
require the same formality of a claim that is required by the
current Patent Statute. Rather, the specification defined the
metes and bounds of the claimed invention, thereby disclosing
to the public what the patentee invented. 36 While the 1870 Act
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same”; and (3) “the specification . . .
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.” In common parlance, as well as in our and our
predecessor court’s case law, those three requirements are referred to
as the “written description requirement,” the ‘enablement
requirement,’ and the ‘best mode requirement,’ respectively.
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir.
2004). See also Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the
35 U.S.C. 112, ¶1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099,
1100 ( Jan. 5, 2001) (“Although the [concepts of written description and
enablement] are entwined, they are distinct and each is evaluated under
separate legal criteria. The written description requirement, a question of
fact, ensures that the inventor conveys to others that he or she had possession
of the claimed invention; whereas, the enablement requirement, a question of
law, ensures that the inventor conveys to others how to make and use the
claimed invention.”).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
35. See Phillips, v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
36.
[One] objective [of the written description requirement] is to provide
notice to the public regarding what the inventor claims as his or her
invention so that the public can resolve any infringement concerns.
This objective also arose during the period when patents did not
contain any claims. The public therefore had to rely solely on the
written description to determine what the inventor was claiming as
his or her exclusive property and what actions would or would not
constitute infringement of the inventor’s rights. Even with the
advent of claims, the specification still satisfies the quid pro quo
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suggested that a claim is a separate, requisite component of a
patent, the requirement that a patent must include “at least
one claim” was not added until the 1952 Act.
Thus, the disconnect often seen today between how claims
are construed and what is described in the specification is
unsupported by the constitutional origins and statutory
development of the laws governing the U.S. patent system.
Construing claims without regard to what the inventor actually
possessed at the time of filing, as measured by the written
description, undermines the quid pro quo bargain contemplated
by the Constitution by threatening to provide patent monopoly
power that exceeds the actual scope of the patentee’s
disclosure.
II. ROLE OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION IN CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION
A. MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, INC.
The Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. 37 is often credited as having created
the modern claim construction process. In fact, Markman did
little to define how courts should go about construing claims.
Rather, the case addressed the much narrower question of
whether judges or juries are better suited to handle claim
construction. The Court ultimately held that “the construction
of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is
exclusively within the province of the court.” 38 The Court’s
holding was ultimately driven by a policy rationale that judges
are better suited than juries to perform the task of claim
construction. 39 The Court explained:
disclosure to the public of the inventive subject matter in exchange for
the grant of a limited period of exclusivity to the inventor.
Sasha Blaug, Michael Shuster, and Henry Su, Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe:
Complying with the Written Description Requirement Under U.S. Patent Law,
21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 97, 99 (2003).
37. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
38. Id. at 372.
39. Id. at 388. While this policy rationale drove the Court’s holding, there
were other factors that further supported the Court’s determination that claim
construction was a task for judges, not juries. For example, the Court
determined that the Constitution’s Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury
trial did not, from a historical perspective, mandate the question of claim
interpretation to be submitted to the jury. Id. at 381-83. In addition, the
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[W]hen an issue “falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has
turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than
another to decide the issue in question.” So it turns out here, for
judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning
of patent terms. The construction of written instruments is one of
those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than
jurors unburdened by training in exegesis . . . . The judge, from his
training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation
to such instruments than a jury . . . . 40

While Markman is often cited for the proposition that
claim construction is a “question of law” that interpretation is
inconsistent with the actual language of the Markman decision.
Rather, the Supreme Court recognized in Markman that claim
construction was not a “pristine” question of law, but rather a
mixed question of law and fact, better delegated to the courts
because a judge is “‘more likely to be right, in performing such
a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.’” 41 The Supreme
Court reasoned that delegating claim construction to judges,
rather than juries, would promote uniformity. 42
The Markman Court also emphasized the unity of the
patent document during the “mongrel practice” of claim
construction: “‘the patent itself . . . like other written
instruments, . . . must be interpreted as a whole . . . and the
legal deductions drawn therefrom must be conformable with
Court concluded that precedent weighed in favor of the court’s “interpretive
role” in construing the meaning of a “legal instrument” such as a patent. Id.
at 387-88 (“‘The duty of interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the
courts. A patent is a legal instrument, to be construed, like other legal
instruments, according to its tenor . . . .’”) (quoting W. Robinson, LAW OF
PATENTS § 732, pp. 481-83 (1890)). The Court ultimately concluded, however,
that “history and precedent provide no clear answers” to the question of
whether claim construction should be delegated to judges or juries, and the
clearest mandate came from its view that judges are “better suited” to perform
the task of claim construction. Id.
40. Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 389 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1140) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1849). See also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court did not suggest . . . that
claim construction is a purely legal question. It held only that, as a policy
matter, the judge, as opposed to the jury, should determine the meaning of a
patent claim.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006): Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1464 (Fed.Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(Mayer, C.J., concurring) (explaining that “the [Supreme] Court chose not to
accept our formulation of claim construction: as a pure question of law to be
decided de novo in all cases on appeal”).
42. 517 U.S. at 391.
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the scope and purpose of the entire document.’” 43 However, the
Markman Court may have obscured this message when it later
described the claims and the written description as “two
distinct elements” of a patent document. 44 By creating a
dichotomy between the claims and the written description,
without specifically delineating the role each is to play in
construing claims, the Markman Court inadvertently sparked a
debate that continues to rage today, and is arguably a root
cause of the perceived failings of the patent system.
B. POST-MARKMAN: REAFFIRMING THE PRIMACY OF THE
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DURING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
As explained above, while Markman answered the question
of who decides claim construction, it did not provide guidance
on how claim construction should be conducted. 45 Thus, postMarkman, the district courts were largely left to their own
devices to determine the procedure and substance of claim
construction. A handful of jurisdictions – namely, the Eastern
District of Texas, Northern District of California, Northern
District of Georgia, and Western District of Pennsylvania –
have adopted patent local rules designed to promote efficiency
and speedy resolution of patent cases by providing, inter alia, a
series of claim construction-related deadlines leading up to a
claim construction (or “Markman”) hearing. In the majority of
jurisdictions that have not adopted patent local rules, there is
great variation among districts and judges as to the discovery
timelines leading up to claim construction, as well as whether

43. Id. at 378, 383 n.8 (quoting Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. 305, 318 (1859)).
44. Id. at 373.
45. As the Federal Circuit explained,
Markman does not require a district court to follow any particular
procedure in conducting claim construction. It merely holds that
claim construction is the province of the court, not a jury. To perform
that task, some courts have found it useful to hold hearings and issue
orders comprehensively construing the claims in issue. Such a
procedure is not always necessary . . . . District courts have wide
latitude in how they conduct the proceedings before them, and there
is nothing unique about claim construction that requires the court to
proceed according to any particular protocol. As long as the trial
court construes the claims to the extent necessary to determine
whether the accused device infringes, the court may approach the
task in any way that it deems best.
Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
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and to what extent Markman hearings are conducted.
As a result of the lack of uniformity regarding claim
construction at the district court level, the Federal Circuit
experienced a flood of claim construction cases in the years
following Markman. Despite variation in the district courts’
handling of claim construction, the issue on appeal often
presented the same underlying dilemma: how to strike the
appropriate balance between reading the claims in light of the
written description and prosecution history without improperly
limiting the claims. At the heart of this challenge was the
question of how district courts should weigh factual evidence
bearing on the meaning of disputed terms in order to assign
them a legally operative meaning during claim construction.
The Federal Circuit’s attempts to respond to this challenge
have created more confusion than clarity. In Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Technologies, Inc., 46 the court created controversy when it
held that the Supreme Court’s Markman decision was
consistent with the concept of treating claim construction as
“purely a matter of law” subject to de novo review. 47 In
reaching this decision, the Cybor court made the puzzling
statement that a construing court “‘is not crediting certain
evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary
findings. Rather, the court is looking to the extrinsic evidence
to assist in its construction of the written document, a task it is
This decision has been widely
required to perform.’” 48
criticized for ignoring the factual questions inherent in claim
construction and providing no deference to a trial court’s
determinations with respect to these factual questions.
Importantly, eight of the twelve Federal Circuit judges agree
that Cybor should be reviewed if the “appropriate” case
arises. 49

46. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
47. Id. at 1454.
48. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F. 3d 967,
981 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
49. In a recent case in which the Federal Circuit denied a request for
rehearing en banc, six separate dissenting and concurring opinions revealed
internal conflict with respect to the Cybor decision. See Amgen, Inc. v.
Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040-46 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453, 75 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007). Judges
Michel, Newman, Rader, Mayer, and Moore all bluntly criticized Cybor.
Judges Gajarsa, Linn, and Dyk also criticized Cybor, though seemed to be
willing to allow for de novo review if extrinsic evidence was not considered by
the district court during claim construction. Id.
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Creating further confusion were the Federal Circuit’s
conflicting decisions in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc. 50
and Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc. 51 regarding the
relative weight that intrinsic evidence (i.e., the written
description and prosecution history) and extrinsic evidence
(e.g., dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony) should be
given by a court faced with the task of claim construction. Just
a few months after Markman, the Federal Circuit in Vitronics
held that “intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of
the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” 52 In
contrast, six years later in Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit
suggested a different approach, holding that claim construction
should be primarily driven by extrinsic sources, such as
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises.
As discussed in greater detail below, the Federal Circuit
provided well-needed clarity in 2005 with its en banc decision
in Phillips v. AWH Corp. 53 In Phillips, the Federal Circuit
explicitly rejected the Texas Digital approach and reiterated
the Vitronics pronouncement that “the specification is always
highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it
is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of
disputed terms.” 54
1. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc.
Shortly after Markman, the Federal Circuit clarified the
imperative role of a patent’s intrinsic evidence – especially the
written description – in determining the proper meaning for a
disputed claim term.
In Vitronics, the parties’ claim
construction dispute centered on the term “solder reflow
temperature” as used in a claim for a method for the reflow
soldering of surface mounted devices to a printed circuit
The asserted claim required “maintaining the
board. 55
temperature of said devices below said solder reflow
temperature.” 56 The plaintiff/patent holder Vitronics argued
50. Vitronics Corp., v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
51. 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003).
52. Vitronics, 90 F. 3d.at 1582.
53. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
54. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).
55. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1579.
56. Id.
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that the specification made it clear that the term meant “the
temperature reached by the solder during the period it is
reflowing during the final stages of the soldering process,” and
not, as the accused infringer Conceptronics contended, the
“liquidus temperature” (i.e., the “temperature at which the
solder first begins to melt.”). 57
In holding that Conceptronics did not infringe the patent,
the district court adopted Conceptronics’ proposed construction
based on extrinsic evidence, particularly expert testimony that
“solder reflow temperature” meant the same thing as “liquidus
temperature.” 58 The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded,
condemning the district court’s reliance on extrinsic evidence to
contradict the unambiguous support in the intrinsic evidence
for Vitronics’ proposed construction. The court explained that
the “peak reflow temperature” and “liquidus temperature” were
clearly defined in the specification to have two separate
meanings.
The solders described in the specification had a liquidus
temperature around 190˚ C and a peak reflow temperature
around 210-218˚ C. In addition, in the description of the
preferred embodiment, “the solder is heated to a temperature of
210˚ C but the temperature of the devices is maintained at
approximately 195˚ C, i.e., below the peak reflow temperature
(210˚ C) but above the liquidus temperature (190˚C).” 59 Given
the claim’s requirement that the temperature of the devices
must be maintained “below said solder reflow temperature,” “if
‘solder reflow temperature’ was defined to mean liquidus
temperature, a preferred – and, indeed, the only –embodiment
in the specification would not fall within the scope of the patent
claim. Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever correct.”60
Thus, the Federal Circuit in Vitronics examined the
evidence that each party had offered in support of its proposed
construction, and correctly treated Vitronics’ evidence
preferentially. The Vitronics Court declared that it is “wellsettled” that, in “interpreting an asserted claim, the court
should look first to the intrinsic evidence”—namely, the patent
claims, specification, and prosecution history — because such
evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 1581.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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meaning of disputed claim language.” 61 The court elaborated:
First, we look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the
scope of the patented invention. . . . [S]econd, it is always necessary to
review the specification to determine whether the inventor has used
any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.
The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication . . . [t]he
specification contains a written description of the invention which
must be clear and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in
the art to make and use it. Thus, the specification is always highly
relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive;
it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term. Third,
the court may also consider the prosecution history of the patent. 62

With respect to extrinsic evidence, the Vitronics Court
explained that “[i]n most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic
evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim
term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic
evidence.” 63 Because Conceptronics’ proposed construction was
based on extrinsic evidence that contradicted the clear meaning
of “solder reflow temperature” as used in the specification of
the patent, the court rejected it in favor of Vitronics’ proposed
construction, which comported with what was described in the
specification.
2. Texas Digital System, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.
More than six years after Vitronics, the Federal Circuit
created confusion with its decision in Texas Digital, which
contradicted the Vitronics court’s pronouncement that the
specification is the “single best guide to the meaning of a
disputed term” and instead emphasized that “dictionaries,
encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to
assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary
meanings of claim terms.” 64
The Texas Digital court began with the observation that
the “analytical focus” of claim construction is the claims
themselves, and that the “terms used in the claims bear a
‘heavy presumption’ that they mean what they say and have
the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words

61. Id. at 1582.
62. Id. at 1582. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 1583.
64. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202
(Fed. Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003).
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by persons skilled in the relevant art.” 65 It advocated that a
court should first consult extrinsic sources, such as
dictionaries, 66 encyclopedias, and treatises to determine the
“full range” of a disputed term’s ordinary and customary
meaning. Then, only as a secondary step should the court
check intrinsic evidence to “identify which of the different
possible dictionary meanings . . . is most consistent with the
use of the words by the inventor.” 67 To the extent that more
than one dictionary meaning is consistent, the claims should be
construed to “encompass all such consistent meanings.” 68
While the Texas Digital court recognized the possibility
that the intrinsic evidence could be “clearly inconsistent” with
the dictionary definition, it stated that the “presumption in
favor of a dictionary definition will be overcome” in only two
circumstances:
where the patentee, acting as his or her own lexicographer, has
clearly set forth an explicit definition of the term different from its
ordinary meaning . . . or if the inventor has disavowed or disclaimed
scope of coverage, by using words or expressions of manifest exclusion
or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope. 69

The Texas Digital approach was flawed for several reasons.
The court’s statement that the “terms used in the claims bear a
‘heavy presumption’ that they mean what they say” 70 is both
conclusory and nonsensical. What the claim terms say is, of
course, not as simple as the text of the words on the page;
likewise, claim construction is not as simple as looking up
definitions in a dictionary. If it were, the Supreme Court would
not have found it necessary to delegate the task of claim
construction to judges. Consistent with the quid pro quo
bargain upon which the patent system is based, claims should
only “mean” what was invented, and what was invented
depends on what the patentee was in possession of at the time
of filing, as defined by the patentee’s written description of the
invention. The Texas Digital approach, however, allowed
dictionary definitions—which have no nexus to what the
patentee possessed—to govern claim construction, unless the

65. 30 F.3d at 1201-02.
66. Where the term “dictionary” is used elsewhere in this article, it refers
to dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises, and the like.
67. Texas Digital, 30 F.3d at 1203.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1204 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 1202.
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written description contained an explicit definition that
deviated from the dictionary definition(s), or if the inventor
expressly disavowed or disclaimed claim scope. This approach
thus encouraged patentees to be vague in their written
descriptions, and led to overly broad claim constructions. 71
In addition, the Texas Digital court’s analysis was based on
the illogical premise that a person skilled in the art would
attribute meaning to a disputed term based on dictionary
definitions, rather than the patentee’s own words to describe
the invention. On the contrary, such a person would be
generally familiar with the terminology employed in the patent,
and would thus have no particular need to consult a dictionary
for a basic definition. Rather, a person skilled in the art would
find guidance in the written description of the invention (and
other intrinsic evidence) to determine the patentee’s specific
use of the terminology in the context of the invention.
3. Phillips v. AWH Corp.
a. Specification Upheld as the “Most Important Guide” to Claim
Construction
On July 12, 2005, the Federal Circuit issued its highly
anticipated en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp. 72 The
principal issue for the court to resolve was “the extent to which
[the courts] should resort to and rely on a patent’s specification
in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims.” 73 The
Phillips court endorsed the Vitronics pronouncement that the
specification “is always highly relevant to the claim
construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” 74 In doing so,
the Federal Circuit upheld the primacy of the specification
71. For an example of a case where the Texas Digital approach led to an
overly broad claim construction, see the discussion of the Federal Circuit’s prePhillips decision in Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(following the Texas Digital to broadly construe the claim term “board”) and
its post-Phillips decision in the same case, Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136
(Fed. Cir., Sept. 14, 2005) (withdrawing its previous opinion in view of Phillips
and limited the term “board” to mean “wood cut from a log”). The Nystrom
cases are discussed in Section II.C.2, infra.
72. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
73. Id. at 1312.
74. Id. at 1315 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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during claim construction, and thereby rejected the
“dictionaries first” approach taken by Texas Digital and its
progeny.
In particular, the Phillips court debunked the Texas
Digital myth that a person skilled in the art would understand
the claims by consulting a dictionary. Rather, the Phillips
court asserted that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] is
deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with
an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field.” 75
The court elaborated:
The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such prominence is
that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather
than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.
Properly viewed, the “ordinary meaning” of a claim term is its
meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent. Yet
heavy reliance on the dictionary divorced from the intrinsic evidence
risks transforming the meaning of the claim term to the artisan into
the meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its particular context,
which is the specification. 76

Of particular concern to the Phillips court was the “risk of
systematic overbreadth” that was posed by a claim construction
approach that begins by consulting broad dictionary
definitions. 77 This risk is “greatly reduced” by an approach
that instead preliminarily examines the intrinsic evidence —
especially the patentee’s written description of the invention —
to discern the legally operative meaning of a disputed claim
Rather than relying on a dictionary with no
term. 78
75. 415 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam,
Ltd.133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
76. Id. at 1321.
77. Id.
Note, however, that the Phillips Court recognized that
dictionaries could have an appropriate role during claim construction. The
Court explained:
judges are free to consult dictionaries and technical treatises “at any
time in order to better understand the underlying technology and
may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms,
so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition
found or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”
Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584).
78. Id. at 1321. The Phillips Court recognized that the prosecution history
was an important source of intrinsic evidence that courts should consider
during claim construction. “Like the specification, the prosecution history
provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent . . .
[and] was created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the
patent.” Id. at 1317 (citations omitted). Yet, in concluding that the
specification carries greater relative weight than the prosecution history, the
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relationship to the patent, the specification “‘acts as a
dictionary’” for the patent at issue “‘when it expressly defines
terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by
implication.’” 79
As the Phillips court explained, regarding the specification
as the “primary basis for construing the claims” is supported by
precedent of the Federal Circuit and its predecessors, as well as
the Supreme Court. 80 Moreover, the court noted:
The importance of the specification in claim construction derives from
its statutory role. The close kinship between the written description
and the claims is enforced by the statutory requirement that the
specification describe the claimed invention in “full, clear, concise,
and exact terms” . . . [i]n light of th[is] statutory directive . . . the
specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the
claims. 81

b. Problems Remaining After Phillips
Phillips was heralded as a much needed, long-overdue
correction to the claim construction process. By clarifying that
the specification should be afforded greater weight than other
types of evidence available to a court during its claim
construction analysis, the Phillips case provided procedural
guidance on how Markman hearings should be conducted.
Specifically, Phillips directed district courts to pay less
attention to extrinsic evidence, and instead focus on the
particular manner in which the patentee has defined the term
Phillips Court pointed out that “the prosecution history represents an ongoing
negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product
of that negotiation.” Id. The “final product” of the negotiation, then,
represents the bargain that the patentee and government ultimately entered
into, and is reflected by the actual words used in the patent to describe the
invention.
79. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582); accord
Irdeto Access., Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (quoting Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group,
Inc. 262 F.3d 1258, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (“Even when guidance is not
provided in explicit definitional format, ‘the specification may define claim
terms by implication such that the meaning may be found in or ascertained by
a reading of the patent documents.’”); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs.,
375 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same).
80. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also, e.g., United States
v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (“It is fundamental that claims are to be
construed in the light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view
to ascertaining the invention.”).
81. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citations omitted).
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in the patent document itself —namely the claims, the written
description in the specification, and the prosecution history —
thus making drafting and prosecuting patent applications even
more important to effective enforcement efforts.
While the guidance provided by the Phillips decision was a
step in the right direction, the outcome of the claim
construction dispute at issue in the case illustrates that certain
fundamental problems persist. Indeed, the great paradox of
Phillips is that the en banc court ultimately reversed the claim
construction rulings of the panel and district court, despite the
fact that these rulings were driven by the specification-focused
procedure advocated by the en banc court. The reversal reflects
the uncertainty in predicting how a court in any particular case
will strike the balance between reading the claims in light of
the specification without improperly importing limitations from
the specification into the claims.
Phillips involved a patent for modular, steel-shell panels
that are welded together to form vandalism-resistant walls for
use in prisons. The claim construction dispute centered on
whether the language “further means disposed inside the shell
for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising internal
steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls[]”
required the baffles to be positioned at obtuse or acute angles
or whether they were not so limited (i.e., whether they could be
positioned at 90-degree angles as well). 82 The district court
interpreted the claim language as a “means-plus function”
claim format subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, and
granted summary judgment of noninfringement on the basis
that the specification limited the scope of the invention to
baffles oriented at obtuse or acute angles. 83 On appeal, a
Federal Circuit panel disagreed that the claim language was
written in means-plus-function format, but ultimately affirmed
summary judgment of noninfringement because the
specification was “‘unmistakably clear that the invention was
limited to baffles angled at other than 90 [degrees].’” 84
Upon rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit reversed
because, based on its review of the specification, a person
skilled in the art would not read the term restrictively. 85 In
82.
83.
84.
2004)).
85.

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1310.
Id. (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1214 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1330-35. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mayer (joined by Judge
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reaching this decision, the Court dismissed the argument that
the claim should be read restrictively because it would be
invalid under a broader reading (i.e., a reading that includes
90º angles).
The Court noted that, “[w]hile we have
acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to
preserve their validity . . . we have limited the maxim to cases
in which ‘the court concludes, after applying all the available
tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.’” 86
The Court then cited to a number of cases standing for the
proposition that limitations cannot be added to a claim for the
purpose of preserving validity when the only reasonable
construction of the claim does not include that limitation. 87
What is puzzling is how the en banc Court could have
concluded that the only reasonable construction of “baffles” is
one that includes 90º angles, when the Federal Circuit panel
and the district court applied the same specification-focused
procedure advocated by the en banc Court, and yet reached the
opposite conclusion.
Also puzzling is the Court’s statement that, in determining
whether claims should be construed to preserve their validity,
“we have looked to whether it is reasonable to infer that the
PTO would not have issued an invalid patent, and that the
ambiguity in the claim language should therefore be resolved in

Newman) argues that the result in Phillips once again demonstrates the
failings of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of claim construction as a pure
question of law, devoid of any factual questions:
[w]hile this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction
is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is
plainly not the case. Claim construction is, or should be, made in
context: a claim should be interpreted both from the perspective of
one of ordinary skill in the art and in view of the state of the art at
the time of invention.
Id. at 1332 (Mayer, J., dissenting). As Judges Mayer and Newman colorfully
describe it, the Phillips Court’s attempt to bring clarity to the claim
construction procedure but failing to afford any deference to the trial court’s
findings on the inherent factual questions “is akin to rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titanic—the orchestra is playing as if nothing is amiss, but the
ship is still heading for Davey Jones’ locker.” Id. at 1334-35.
86. Id. at 1327 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d
898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
87. Id. (citing, e.g., Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc.,
214 F.3d 1302, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“having concluded that the amended
claim is susceptible of only one reasonable construction, we cannot construe
the claim different . . . in order to preserve its validity”).
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a manner that would preserve the patent’s validity.” 88 This
statement implies that it would only be “reasonable” to infer
the PTO issued a valid patent in limited circumstances —
which flies in the face of the presumption of validity that
attaches to all patents issued by the PTO. 89 Indeed, all patents
are presumed valid and their claims are presumed to have
written description support. 90 As every patent litigant knows,
however, the construction of key terms is often in dispute, and,
as every judge tasked with claim construction knows, there
may be sound arguments supporting each of the competing
constructions. Given that the PTO is not charged with the task
of claim construction (and does not issue patents with any type
of accompanying instruction regarding its understanding of
claim scope), a construing court can never be entirely sure
which of the competing constructions the PTO had in mind
when it issued the patent. What the court can be sure of,
however, is that the PTO intended to issue a valid patent.
While the Federal Circuit “has urged caution in construing
claims in order to preserve their validity, no precedent or logic
requires that when more than one claim construction is
available, the court must choose the broader one although it
may invalidate the claim.” 91 When a court must decide
between two competing constructions for a disputed term, and
one construction would invalidate the claim and the other
would not, it is “reasonable” for the court to adopt the
construction that would preserve the validity of the claim. Not
only would it be “reasonable to infer that the PTO would not
have issued an invalid patent” 92 in such a case, it would be
unreasonable to do otherwise, given the presumption of
validity.

88. Id. at 1327.
89. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
90. Id.
91. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1042
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453,
75 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007).
92. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327.
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C. INTEGRATING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION ANALYSES IS EVOLUTIONARY, NOT
REVOLUTIONARY
1. Pre-Phillips Cases
The Federal Circuit’s Phillips decision affirmed the written
description as the primary guide to interpreting the meaning of
disputed claim language, thus making it less likely that a
patentee will be able to exploit the claim construction process
to obtain a dictionary-based construction for a claim term that
vastly exceeds the scope of what the patentee’s written
description actually disclosed. While the danger of overbreadth
was reduced by this holding, more can and should be done by
the courts in order to alleviate the risk of giving “patent
monopoly power” in excess of what the patentee actually
possessed and disclosed at the time of filing. In particular, the
Federal Circuit should take the logic of Phillips one step
further, and require the patentee to demonstrate that its
proposed construction complies with the written description
requirement.
Analytically, this proposal is not a radical departure from
the approach taken by the Federal Circuit in pre-Phillips cases
where the specification’s inclusion of an explicit definition or a
“clear disavowal of claim scope” make it obvious that the
patentee’s proposed construction lacks written description
support. 93 For example, in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 94 the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of
noninfringement based the patentee’s inability to show that its
broad construction of the term “water-soluble polydextrose” was
supported by the written description. 95 The patents at issue
were directed to the process of remedying the bitter taste
produced by polydextrose by passing it through an ionexchange resin. 96 The written description explained that the
bitter taste was due to the use of citric acid in the process,
causing remnant citric acid to be bound to the product. 97 The

93. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
94. 224 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95. Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F. 3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 1329-30.
97. Id. at 1330.
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written description also provided an express definition for the
term “water-soluble polydextrose”: “[a]s used herein, the
expression ‘water-soluble polydextrose’. . . specifically refers to
the water-soluble polydextrose prepared by melting and
heating dextrose . . . in the presence of a catalytic amount . . . of
citric acid.” 98 Although the asserted claims said nothing of
citric acid, the alleged infringer argued that the specification
limited the term “water-soluble polydextrose” to “polydextrose
produced with citric acid as a catalyst.” 99 The district court
agreed and, accordingly, entered summary judgment of
noninfringement because the alleged infringer’s process used
phosphoric
acid,
not
citric
acid.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Bell Atlantic Network
Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc. 100 provides
an example of a case in which the Federal Circuit found that
the written description did not support the broad construction
proposed by the patentee, even though the narrower meaning
was not set forth in explicit definitional format. The patentee
alleged infringement of its patent for digital subscriber line
The district court granted summary
(“DSL”) services. 101
judgment of noninfringement by adopting limited constructions
of the claim terms at issue. 102 The claim construction dispute
centered on, inter alia, the “plurality of different modes”
limitation contained in the following claim language:
[A] second transceiver, connected to said first transceiver via said
subscriber loop, for selectively operating in one of said plurality of
different modes, said second transceiver transmitting or receiving said
first channel signals at said first transmission rate on said first
channel and transmitting or receiving said second channel signals at
said second transmission rate on said second transmission rate on
said second channel; and a controller connected to said first
transceiver for selectively changing said first and second transmission
rates. 103

Based on an analysis of the intrinsic evidence, and in
particular the written description of the invention, the district
court restricted the “plurality of different modes” to the three
modes described therein: “conventional ADSL” mode, “bi-

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1265-66.
Id.
Id. at 1265.
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directional” mode, and “reversible” mode. 104 The district court
observed that “throughout the specification, the written
description describes only these three modes” and, therefore, “it
would ‘not broaden . . . the term beyond . . . the support in the
specification, as the three modes discussed in the patent
specification literally occupy the field of possibilities
contemplated by the inventor.” 105 The Federal Circuit affirmed
this construction, noting the written description can “dictat[e]
the manner in which the claims are to be construed, even if the
guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format.” 106
Thus, according to the Federal Court’s Bell Atlantic decision,
when a patentee uses a claim term throughout the specification
in a manner consistent with only a single meaning, he has
defined that term “‘by implication.’” 107
In Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 108 patentee
Wang alleged that AOL and Netscape infringed its patent
directed to an online information system. The parties agreed
that the ordinary meaning of “frame” as used in the patent
included bit-mapped display systems and character-based
systems. Wang argued in favor of the broad construction that
would include both of these types of systems. AOL and
Netscape, which used bit-mapped systems, argued that Wang’s
invention only described character-based systems. The district
court adopted AOL and Netscape’s limited construction, and
granted summary judgment of noninfringement on that basis.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the
written description only described character-based systems.
A representative example of the patent’s usage of the term
“frame” follows:
The videotext supplier electronically stores the information supplied
by the different sources in the form of hundreds of thousands of pages
(frames) each representing a collection (arranged, for example, in

104. Id. at 1266.
105. Id. at 1266.
106. Id. at 1268.
107. Id. at 1271 (citations omitted). In addition, based on a reading of the
written description, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the
“channels” limitation should be restricted to “an amount of bandwidth isolated
for communications.” Conceding that the ordinary meaning of “channel” is
“quite broad”, the Court found that the written description “defines the first
and second channels, by implication, as amounts of bandwidth, and thus,
communication paths separated by frequency.” Id. at 1277.
108. 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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rows and columns) of alphanumeric and graphic characters to be
displayed on a cathode ray tube (CRT) at the subscriber’s location. 109

Wang argued that the display of “alphanumeric and
graphic characters” can include character-based and bitmapped displays, and that the parenthetical use of “for
example” implied that any character-based limitation is merely
exemplary. 110 AOL and Netscape contended that the use of
“frame” in conjunction with “characters” restricted the
invention to a character-based protocol, and that a characterbased protocol was the only protocol described in the written
description
or
shown
in
the
patent
drawings. 111
In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit agreed
with AOL and Netscape’s position that the written description
supported only a character-based system. In addition, the
Federal Circuit noted that its conclusion was reinforced by the
fact that Wang’s proposed broad construction would not have
been enabled by the specification. The inventors had testified,
and thus it was “not disputed,” that “Wang had not been able to
implement a bit-mapped protocol.” 112 Wang argued that the
fact that a bit-mapped protocol was not enabled by the
specification was “irrelevant” to claim construction. The Court
responded:
[T]he claims are not properly construed to have a meaning or scope
that would lead to their invalidity for failure to satisfy the
requirements of patentability. Although Wang is correct that a claim
is not invalid simply because it embraces subject matter that is not
specifically illustrated, in order to be covered by the claims that
subject matter must be sufficiently described as the applicant’s
invention to meet the requirements of section 112. This requirement
was not met as to protocols other than character-based.

In other words, “‘when claims are amenable to more than
one construction, they should when reasonably possible be
interpreted so as to preserve their validity.’” 113
109. Id. at 1381.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1381.
112. Id. at 1382.
113. Id at 1383 (citing Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In Digital Biometrics, Inc. v.
Indentix Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998), plaintiff Digital Biometrics
brought suit against Indentix, alleging infringement of its patent related to a
system for generating digital fingerprint images.
Affirming summary
judgment of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit found that the written
description and prosecution history adopted Indentix’s narrow construction of
the terms “array” and “slice data.” Id. at 1346. Moreover, the Court noted
that if the broad construction was adopted, “we are not sure the resulting
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In Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 114 the
Federal Circuit similarly limited the meaning of a claim term
based on the failure of the written description to support a
broader meaning. The patent at issue covered an improved
touch probe for use in the automated manufacturing and
measurement field to check the dimensions of machined parts
with extreme precision. The claim term at issue was the word
“when” as used in a claim, which provided “a touch probe . . .
which has a sensing tip at a free end thereof, the probe
generating a trigger signal when said sensing tip contacts an
object and said stylus holder is thereby deflected relative to
said housing . . . .” 115 The district court narrowly construed
“when” to mean “as soon as possible” after contact, and granted
summary judgment of noninfringement as a result of this
narrow construction.
On appeal, Renishaw argued that “when” should be
broadly construed to mean “at or after the time that” so that
the claim would read on a claim that waited an appreciable
amount of time before generating a trigger signal. 116 The
alleged infringer, Marposs, argued that the written description
demonstrated a “clear intent to provide triggering as soon as
possible after contact.” 117 The Federal Circuit agreed with
Marposs and the district court, finding that the written
description was
[r]eplete with references that indicate that the patentee was
preeminently concerned with generating a trigger signal as soon as
possible after contact . . . [and] shows that the patentee’s invention is
directed at a machine that produces very accurate, very precise probe
readings by maintaining tight control over the position of the stylus.
In the context of the invention, such readings can only be obtained if
the probe triggers very, very soon after contact. 118

The Renishaw Court was persuaded by statements made in
the written description because, fundamentally, it represented
claim would be enabled.” Id. at 1348.
114. 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 1246 (emphasis added).
116. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320-21 (“requiring that any definition of claim
language in the specification be express, is inconsistent with our rulings that
the specification is ‘the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,’
and that the specification ‘acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.’”) (citations
omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1251-52 (emphasis added).
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the invention that the patentee actually possessed and
disclosed at the time of filing:
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be
determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the
inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.
The construction that stays true to the claim language and most
naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be,
in the end, the correct construction. 119

As these cases show, and as the Federal Circuit confirmed
in Phillips, the written description can indeed narrowly define
the proper scope of a claim term even when an explicit
definition is not articulated. 120
2. Post-Phillips Cases
Because Phillips confirmed that the specification is the
primary guide to discerning the meaning of a disputed claim
term, post-Phillips claim construction disputes often center on
the precise words used by the patentee in the written
description. Post-Phillips, construing courts are often charged
with the task of examining the written description to determine
whether a disputed term should be given a broad or narrow
definition. While it is not feasible to discuss every post-Phillips
case bearing on the written description requirement in this
Article, a handful of representative cases are discussed below.
Nystrom v. Trex Co. 121 is a case that particularly reveals
the impact of Phillips because it led to two claim construction
determinations by the Federal Circuit, one before and one after
the Phillips decision. In its 2004 (pre-Phillips) Nystrom
decision (Nystrom I), the Federal Circuit followed Texas
Digital’s “dictionaries first” approach to claim construction and
held that the term “board”, as used in a patent relating to deck
boards designed to shed water, should be broadly construed to
mean “a flat piece of wood or similarly rigid material adapted
for special use.” 122 The Nystrom I court therefore rejected the
accused infringer’s argument that “board” should be limited to
mean boards made of “wood cut from a log.” 123 The court
reasoned that multiple dictionaries revealed that “the ordinary

119. Id. at 1249 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 1582.
121. 374 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nystrom I), op. withdrawn by, sub’d
op. at 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir., Sept. 14, 2005) (Nystrom II).
122. 374 F.3d at 1112.
123. Id.
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meaning of the word ‘board’ encompasses both a piece of cut
wood or sawn timber and a similarly-shaped item made of a
rigid material.” 124 However, in 2005, following the Federal
Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips, the Federal Circuit
withdrew its Nystrom I opinion and reconsidered the claim
construction issue in view of the Phillips court’s holding that
the specification was the most important guide to claim
construction (Nystrom II). 125 The court determined that the
prior claim construction of “board” was overly broad and that
the written description limited its meaning to wood cut from a
log. 126 The Nystrom II court reasoned: “as explained in
Phillips, Nystrom is not entitled to a claim construction
divorced from the context of the written description and
prosecution history. The written description and prosecution
history consistently use the term ‘board’ to refer to wood
decking materials cut from a log.”
In another important post-Phillips case, Abraxis Bioscience, Inc.
(f/k/a Astrazeneca Pharma. LP, et al.) v. Mayne Pharma. Inc., 127
the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s finding of literal
infringement on the basis that the district court’s broad
definition of the claim term at issue was clearly erroneous in
view of the teachings of the specification. The patent related to
an improved formulation of a pharmaceutical composition used
to induce and maintain general anesthesia and sedation in
patients. 128 The claim construction dispute centered on the
claim term “edetate,” which the district court construed to
mean “EDTA as well as compounds structurally related to
EDTA regardless of how they are synthesized.” 129 The district
court explained that the specification expressly defined
“edetate” to mean “EDTA and derivatives thereof.” 130 The
district court then broadly construed “derivatives” to
encompass “structural analogs of EDTA as well as synthetic

124. Id.
125. Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nystrom II), reh’g
denied, reh’g en banc denied, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 26669 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1,
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1654 (U.S., Apr. 3, 2006).
126. Id. at 1144-45.
127. 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
128. Id. at 1376.
129. Id. at 1374-75.
130. Id. at 1375. EDTA is an abbreviation for ethylenediaminetetraacetic
acid.
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derivatives.” 131
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the accused infringer
Mayne Pharma argued that the district court erred by adopting
a broad claim construction for the term “edetate” that would
include structural analogs as “derivatives.” 132 In particular,
Mayne contended that the proper construction of “edetate” was
“the salts or anions of EDTA.” 133 Abraxis (the assignee of the
patents-in-suit) responded that the district court’s broad
construction of “edetate” was proper in light of certain
statements in the specification. 134 The Federal Circuit agreed
with Mayne, and thus rejected the broad definition adopted by
the district court. The Federal Circuit’s decision was based on
its careful examination of the specification.
The Abraxis court first considered the passage in the
written description in which the patentee expressly defined the
term “edetate”:
By the term “edetate” we mean ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid
(EDTA) and derivatives thereof, for example the disodium derivative
is known as disodium edetate. In general suitable edetates of this
invention are those salts having lower affinity for EDTA than
calcium. Particular derivatives of use in the present invention
include trisodium edetate, tetrasodium edetate and disodium calcium
edetate. 135

The court noted that all of the “suitable” derivatives listed
in this passage were EDTA salts, not structural analogs. 136
Although Abraxis had persuaded the district court that these
EDTA salts were merely exemplary and not limiting, the
Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that “in the context of the
entire specification, it is evident that the listing of various
EDTA salts defines the term ‘derivatives.’ At the very least,
Of
‘derivatives’ does not include structural analogs.” 137
particular significance to the court was the fact that the
patentee had experimented with a variety of chemical
compositions that would be suitable for the invention, and
“unexpectedly found that edetate, which is not regarded as a
broad spectrum antimicrobial agent was the only agent that

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1376-77 (citing the patent specification).
Id. at 1377.
Id.
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would meet our requirements.” 138 The court explained, “[t]hat
statement indicates that edetate possessed particular chemical
properties that allowed it to work as an effective antimicrobial
agent and that the term ‘derivatives’ was not intended to
extend
broadly.” 139
Ultimately, the court concluded that the listing of EDTA
salts as
“[p]articular derivatives of use in the present invention,” coupled with
the statements regarding the uniqueness of edetate as the only
successful antimicrobial agent, and the patentees’ description of
EDTA salts as advantageous, preferable, and “exceptional,” limit the
term “derivatives” to EDTA salts or compounds that maintain the
EDTA free acid structure. Those statements are inconsistent with a
definition of “derivatives” that includes structural analogs that can
encompass a large number of non-derivative compounds. That
definition fails to recognize that the patentees’ discovery focused on
the unexpected effectiveness of edetate and its salts as antimicrobial
agents. 140

Although Abraxis was able to point to various instances in
the specification that purported to support a broader
construction, the court examined the overall context and
meaning of the written description and found that narrower
construction was justified. For example, Abraxis cited the
statement in the specification that “[t]he nature of the edetate
is not critical, provided that it fulfils the function of preventing
significant growth of microorganisms for at least 24 hours in
the event of adventitious extrinsic contamination.” 141 The
court was unmoved by this statement, explaining that,
when read in context, that statement does support a narrow
construction. It appears in the specification directly after the listing
of the various EDTA salts that the patentees identified as suitable
edetates. Thus, the statement that the “nature of the edetate is not
critical” only connotes that the choice of which particular agent to
use, i.e., EDTA or any EDTA salt, itself is not of critical importance,
as long as the agent chosen can adequately prevent microbial growth.
Contrary to Abraxis’ suggestion, that sentence does not support a
broad construction for “derivatives.” 142

In addition, Abraxis cited to the patentees’ use of the

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.(citing patent specification).
Id.
Id. at 1377-78.
Id. (citing patent specification).
Id. (emphasis added).
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term “derivatives” in the context of silicone. 143 Abraxis argued
that
the
specification
identifies
“dimethicone”
and
“simethicone” as “silicone derivative[s],” which are structural
analogs of silicone. Abraxis argued that using the term in the
context of silicone to broadly describe a class of antifoaming
agents supports a broader definition for “derivatives” in the
context of “edetate.” 144 Importantly, the court disagreed:
[t]hat term was used to describe a general class of antifoaming agents
as disclosed in another patent. That is far removed from the pointed
discussion in the specification identifying the “derivatives” of
“edetate.” Thus, the passing reference to silicone derivatives fails to
overcome our conclusion that the patentees narrowly defined edetate
“derivatives” to mean EDTA and its salts. 145

The Abraxis court’s decision is important because it shows
that the written description can compel a narrow construction
not only where there is no explicit, narrow definition set forth
in the specification, but also where there is no “clear disavowal”
of claim scope or criticism of prior art on the basis of a
particular, broader feature. The district court, which had
construed the claims pre-Phillips, had adopted a broad
construction for “derivatives” largely because the “patentees did
not disavow structural analogs from their definition of
derivatives or criticize their usage.” 146 While the district court
later issued an opinion to the effect that its “claim construction
was consistent with the approach suggested in Phillips,” 147 the
Federal Circuit clearly disagreed.
The written description can compel a narrow construction
even where there is an explicit broadening statement made
during prosecution. In Honeywell International, Inc. v. ITT
Industries, Inc., 148 the patent holder Honeywell sought to
assert patent claims in a patent disclosing a fuel filter that was
specially made for use in motor vehicles having electronic fuel
injection (EFI) systems. 149 At issue was the construction of the
term “fuel injection system component.” Honeywell advocated
a broad construction for the term, specifically contending that
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 352 F. Supp.
2d 403, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
147. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26196, at *49 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
148. 452 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
149. Id.
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the term was not limited to fuel filters as argued by the alleged
infringer. The district court agreed with the accused infringer’s
narrower construction, declaring that, “notwithstanding the
ordinary meaning or the prosecution history, the written
description clearly limited the ‘fuel injection system component’
to a fuel filter, and statements in the prosecution history could
not be used to enlarge the content of the written
description.” 150 In affirming the district court’s decision, the
Federal Circuit explained:
[E]ven if we were to agree with Honeywell that the patentee clearly
expressed his intention during prosecution to have the “fuel injection
system component” limitation include components in addition to a
fuel filter, it would not change the result in this case. As we
determined above, the written description provides only a fuel filter
that is made with polymer housing and electrically conductive fibers
interlaced therein. No other fuel injection system component with the
claimed limitations is disclosed or suggested. Where, as here, the
written description clearly identifies what his invention is, an
expression by a patentee during prosecution that he intends his claims
to cover more than what his specification discloses is entitled to little
weight. 151

The Honeywell Court’s holding reveals the primacy of the
written description in claim construction. If the patentee’s
words in the written description direct a narrower construction,
that construction cannot be “broadened” by statements made
during prosecution. 152
While Phillips has properly shifted the claim construction
focus to the written description, construing courts (like the
district court in the Abraxis case) often presume a broad
construction (i.e., “the full effect to the ordinary and
accustomed meaning of claim terms”) unless the accused
infringer proves otherwise. 153 This approach places the burden
150. Id. at 1316 (citing Honeywell International Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc.,
330 F. Supp. 2d 865, 882-83 (E.D. Mich. 2004)) (emphasis added).
151. 452 F.3d at 1319 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
152. See also Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Laboratories, Inc., 318 F.3d 1132, 1140
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[r]epresentations during prosecution cannot enlarge the
content of the specification, and the district court was correct in relying on the
specification in analyzing the claims.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted);
Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the
claims do not “enlarge what is patented beyond what the inventor has
described as the invention.”).
153. Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (a court must presume that the terms in the claim mean what they
say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and
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on the alleged infringer to prove a negative (i.e., that the
written description does not support the full breadth of a
patentee’s proposed construction). While this burden may be
relatively easy to shoulder in the obvious case where the
written description is unmistakably clear that a broad reading
is not supported (i.e., because there is an explicit narrow
definition articulated in the specification, a clear disavowal of
claim scope, or criticism of prior art that would encompass a
broader definition), it becomes onerous in the more difficult
cases in which the written description is not as clear. The
result is that the patentee – the party who is not only
responsible for any lack of clarity in the written description,
but who is also statutorily obligated to describe the invention in
“full, clear, concise, and exact terms” – is allowed to benefit
from vague, ambiguous, or otherwise poorly drafted
descriptions of their inventions.
III. PROCEDURAL IMPLEMENTATION
Phillips neatly sets the stage for the next act, or perhaps
the next several acts, in the development of patent law. As
evidenced by the opinions accompanying the Federal Circuit’s
2006 denial of rehearing in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 154 Phillips acted as a springboard that launched
the Federal Circuit into an internal debate regarding the
fact/law distinction in claim construction. Resolution of this
question is surely necessary. Lurking beneath the surface of
that debate, however, is a more elementary solution to the
problems plaguing the patent system. In particular, the time is
ripe for proactive application of the written description
requirement. As discussed below, and in contrast to other
proposals to reform or “fix” the patent system, the only barriers
to taking the step proposed here are practical and
procedural. 155
accustomed meaning of claim terms) (citing cases).
154. 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453, 75
U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007). See also supra note 49.
155. See supra note 31 (discussing the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (H.R.
1908)); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (advocating
changing the standard for invalidating a patent from “clear and convincing
evidence” to “preponderance of the evidence”). While the Patent Reform Act of
2007 and the FTC report include a variety of intriguing and potentially viable
reforms to the patent system, both call for major changes to the substantive
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A. THE CURRENT PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK
In current practice, district courts consider claim
construction and compliance with the written description
requirement in entirely different contexts, and are loath to
combine the two. Claim construction is typically handled in a
series of briefs leading to a short hearing toward the end of
discovery.
In complex cases, the entire issue of claim
construction may be referred to a magistrate or special master.
In districts where specialized patent rules are in effect, the
parties are compelled to state their positions on claim
construction early in the case, and work together to narrow the
scope of their disputes. Once the parties have agreed which
terms are in dispute, the patent rules provide for an exchange
of briefs on claim construction, followed by a Markman hearing.
The defense of lack of written description, by contrast, is
generally presented for decision either in a motion for summary
judgment or at trial. In either case, consideration of a written
description defense almost invariably takes place after the
claims have been construed. Details of the defense will
typically be disclosed earlier in contention interrogatory
responses, expert reports, or in disclosures of invalidity
contentions required by patent local rules. However, litigants
who attempt to inject issues of compliance with the written
description requirement into the claim construction analysis
are routinely rebuffed on the basis that the section 112 issues
are premature. 156 It is unclear whether the reluctance of
district courts to grapple with written description in
conjunction with claim construction derives from a belief that
precedent requires treating the two inquiries separately, or
whether it is a reflection of the general reluctance to deal with
the often confounding issue of adequacy of written description.
In either event, the result is that challenges to the adequacy of
the written description are often pushed to the end of cases,
overshadowed by other issues and defenses, and not afforded
due consideration.

and procedural law.
156. For an exemplary case, see the discussion of the Federal Circuit's dual
decisions in the Liebel-Flarsheim case in Section III.C, infra.
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B. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION COMPLIANCE WOULD DOVETAIL WITH
THE EXISTING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCESS
Following Phillips, district courts now have a directive to
take proper account of the specification in the claim
construction process in every case. No longer can a district
court short circuit the analysis of the meaning of a disputed
claim term through reliance on a dictionary definition of the
term. Phillips leaves no doubt that the court must analyze the
specification and give weight to its teachings when considering
the parties’ competing claim constructions. As such, going
forward a district court will inevitably have before it (and will
have thoroughly examined) the bulk of the evidence bearing on
the written description requirement. It would add little burden
on the parties to complete that record, and on the courts to
consider additional evidence and argument, so as to grapple
with the written description question at a time when the
impact of the specification on the scope of the claims is already
the analytical focus.
In the vast majority of cases, it is the patentee’s proposed
claim construction that pushes the boundaries of compliance
with the written description requirement. The patentee is also
uniquely positioned to demonstrate what subject matter it was
in possession of at the time the patent application was filed.
Accordingly, the burden should rest on the patentee in the first
instance to demonstrate that its proposed claim construction
complies with the written description requirement.
In districts with patent local rules, consideration of written
description support could be integrated into the claim
construction process with little or no change to the existing
rules. Taking the Northern District of California rules as
exemplary, parties are required to exchange proposed terms
and claim elements for construction very early in discovery,
and shortly thereafter to exchange preliminary claim
constructions and identify extrinsic evidence relating to claim
construction. 157 These preliminary filings would provide the
parties with sufficient knowledge such that the accused
157. The Northern District of California was the first district to implement
patent local rules. All districts to subsequently adopt patent local rules have
modeled their rules closely on the Northern District of California rules. As a
result, the sequence and timing of claim construction filings is essentially the
same across all districts where patent local rules apply. The patent local rules
for the Northern District of California are available on its website,
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/.
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infringer could state, in the Joint Claim Construction and
Prehearing Statement called for in Patent Local Rule 4.3,
whether it believes the patentee’s position on claim
construction
would
violate
the
written
description
requirement. 158 Existing Rule 4.3(e) permits the parties to
raise in this prehearing statement “any other issues which
might appropriately be taken up at a prehearing conference,”
and thus already contemplates that issues beyond pure claim
construction may be raised. If compliance with the written
description requirement is identified as an issue in the Rule 4.3
Statement, the patentee would then be obligated to establish in
its opening claim construction brief (pursuant to Rule 4.5(a))
that its proposed claim construction would not violate the
written description requirement. 159 The accused infringer
could respond to the patentee’s showing in its Rule 4.5(b)
responsive claim construction brief, and the patentee could in
turn reply under Rule 4.5(c). 160
In districts without patent local rules, the process would
remain fluid. District judges could require all patentees to
establish compliance with the written description requirement
in their initial briefs on claim construction, and then allow
accused infringers to respond in subsequent briefs.
Alternatively, judges could direct the parties to confer on the
issue of whether the parties’ competing claim constructions
raise an issue of compliance with the written description
requirement before compelling the patentee to make a showing
of compliance. The same basic approach would apply to

158. Local P.R. 4.3 currently requires each party to submit, inter alia, a
proposed construction for each disputed claim term, along with “an
identification of all references from specification or prosecution history that
support that construction, and an identification of any extrinsic evidence
known to the party on which it intends to rely either to support its proposed
construction or to oppose the other party’s proposed construction . . . .”
159. Local P.R. 4.5(a) provides: “Not later than 45 days after serving and
filing the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, the party
claiming patent infringement shall serve and file an opening brief and any
evidence supporting its claim construction.”
160. Local P.R. 4.5(b) provides: “Not later than 14 days after service upon it
of an opening brief, each opposing party shall serve and file its responsive
brief and supporting evidence.” Local P.R. 4.5(c) provides: “Not later than 7
days after service upon it of a responsive brief, the party claiming patent
infringement shall serve and file any reply brief and any supporting evidence
directly rebutting the supporting evidence contained in an opposing party’s
response.”
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Markman hearings, regardless of the applicability of patent
local rules, with patentees bringing forward argument and
evidence on written description as part of their presentations,
and accused infringers responding with evidence and
argument.
C. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY WOULD REMAIN INTACT
It is important to bear in mind that this procedure would
not shift to the patentee the burden of proving validity. Just as
the claim construction process currently does not impose strict
burdens of proof, there would be no defined threshold showing
the patentee would be required to meet in order for the court to
adopt its proposed claim construction. District courts would
retain the ability to adopt a claim construction even if doing so
would likely result in invalidity based upon inadequate written
description support. In fact, in some cases, written description
compliance would properly remain a question of patent validity.
In particular, when there is a question as to whether there is
any written description support for a particular claim
limitation, as opposed to how much the written description
supports (i.e., whether the written description supports the full
breadth of the patentee’s proposed definition or something
narrower), it makes sense to examine written description
compliance in the context of a validity analysis. For example,
in Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., the Federal Circuit
invalidated certain claims for a sectional sofa because the claim
limitation calling for a “pair of control means, one for each
reclining seat; mounted on the double reclining seat sofa
section . . .” for lack of compliance with the written description
requirement because “the original disclosure clearly identifies
the console as the only possible location for the controls.” 161 In
Gentry Gallery, the question of written description compliance
could not have been resolved at the claim construction phase
because a claim requiring controls “mounted on the double
reclining seat sofa section” could not have been construed to
mean controls mounted on the console. It was, therefore,
entirely proper for the Gentry Gallery court to consider lack of
written description compliance during the validity phase, and
nothing in this proposal would diminish a court’s ability to do
so.
Thus, rather than compliance with the written description
161. 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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requirement becoming a necessary prerequisite to adoption of a
particular claim construction, the intent of this proposal is to
compel courts and parties to consider the two issues together
(particularly when the claim construction dispute hinges on the
breadth to confer upon a disputed claim term), rather than
continuing to perpetuate the fallacy that they are separate
inquiries. Accused infringers would remain free to challenge
validity for lack of adequate written description, regardless of
the outcome of claim construction. That is to say, under the
proposed procedure, if a court were to accept a patentee’s broad
claim construction over the accused infringer’s objection that
doing so would violate the written description requirement, the
accused infringer would still have the opportunity to later
challenge the patent’s validity by clear and convincing
evidence. Indeed, it is reasonable to anticipate that such a
process would increase the frequency of written description
challenges, as the relevant issues would be crystallized earlier
than is currently the case, thus allowing the parties to develop
more complete evidentiary records and better frame the issues
for consideration in motions for summary judgment or at trial.
Conversely, if the court were to reject a patentee’s proposed
construction on the basis of non-compliance with the written
description requirement, it would not be tantamount to a ruling
of invalidity. At most, it would be an exercise of the maxim
that claims should, where possible, be construed so as to
preserve their validity. 162
Although the Federal Circuit attacked this maxim in its
decision in Phillips, 163 there is nothing in the law that compels
a court to adopt the broader of two possible claim constructions

162. See, e.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d
1106. 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It remains true that we will construe claims to
preserve validity, if possible.”); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface
Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Claim language
should generally be construed to preserve validity, if possible.”).
163. The Phillips Court remarked,
While we have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be
construed to preserve their validity, we have not applied that
principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a regime in
which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction.
Instead, we have limited the maxim to cases in which “the court
concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction,
that the claim is still ambiguous.”
415 F.3d at 1327 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898,
911 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal citation omitted).
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where there is compelling evidence that doing so will render
the claims invalid for lack of written description. In fact, postPhillips developments in the Liebel-Flarsheim case that the
Phillips court relied on to undermine this maxim exemplify the
inefficiency of treating written description compliance and
claim construction as wholly separate inquiries.
In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. 164 , the claim
construction dispute centered on whether the claimed powered
fluid injectors required pressure jackets, even though the
claims did not expressly recite the term “pressure jackets.” The
district court declined to limit the scope of the claims to fluid
injectors with pressure jackets and the Federal Circuit affirmed
this claim construction in 2004. In reaching this decision, the
court noted that “the specification in this case contains no
disclaimer, all that Medrad can point to . . . is the absence of
any embodiment that lacks a pressure jacket.” The court also
pointed out that the specification did not distinguish the
invention from the prior art on the basis that the prior art
lacked pressure jackets. 165 In addition, there was a clear
statement during prosecution indicating the patentee’s
intention to cover injectors with and without pressure
jackets. 166
While Liebel was successful in its quest for a broad
construction, it lost the validity battle. Medrad challenged the
validity of the broad claims based on lack of compliance with
the written description requirement and enablement
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. The district court
“observed that the written description and enablement
requirements often rise and fall together, and determined that
the asserted claims of the front-loading patents ‘are of a far
greater scope than [Liebel’s] specification of what it invented or
possessed when it filed its application.’” 167 In 2007, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s invalidation of the patent
claims because the specification did not support the broad
construction that the patent holder had urged. 168
Because the Federal Circuit first examined the claims for
lack of enablement and determined that they were invalid on

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 907.
Id. at 909.
481 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing district court ruling).
Id. at 1378.
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that basis, it did “not need to consider the written description
holding of invalidity.” 169 Nevertheless, based on the court’s
analysis of the specification, it is likely that the Federal Circuit
would have reached the same conclusion as the district court
had it considered the issue. In particular, the court noted that
“nowhere does the specification describe an injector with a
disposable syringe without a pressure jacket” and, “[i]n fact,
the specification teaches away from such an invention.” 170 The
Federal Circuit explained that
[t]he irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully pressed to have
its claims include a jacketless system, but, having won that battle, it
then had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it
could not meet. The motto, “be careful of what one asks for,” might be
applicable here. 171

The Liebel case demonstrates the efficiency that could be
gained in treating written description compliance in
conjunction with claim construction when a court is faced with
a broad and narrow proposed claim construction for a
particular claim term. Cases limiting the maxim that claims
should be construed to preserve their validity generally involve
situations where preserving validity through claim construction
would involve “revis[ing] or ignor[ing] the explicit language of
the claims,” or adding limitations in order to preserve
validity. 172 In Liebel, the court could have construed the
claimed fluid injector to require a pressure jacket without
revising or ignoring anything in the claims. The court could
have simply construed the fluid injector in view of the
specification, which instructed that the fluid injector of the
invention was one with a pressure jacket. If, however, the
patentee in Liebel had managed to obtain some claims that
explicitly recited a fluid injector without a pressure jacket, the
court could not have resolved compliance with the written
description during claim construction. Rather, such claims

169. Id. at 1380.
170. Id. at 1380.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Tech., Inc., 263 F.3d
1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Claims can only be construed to preserve their
validity where the proposed claim construction is ‘practicable,’ is based on
sound claim construction principles, and does not revise or ignore the explicit
language of the claims.”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that limitations
should be added to claims to preserve the validity of the claims).
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would be analogous to those at issue in Gentry Gallery, where it
was appropriate to consider the lack of written description
compliance during the invalidity stage.
Moreover, as discussed above, an examination of postMarkman claim construction cases reveals that this proposal is
not a radical departure from the approach the Federal Circuit
has taken in previous cases where a clear issue of inadequate
written description arises in the claim construction process. 173
Such precedent stands as proof that there is no legal barrier to
considering written description and claim construction
together.
Considering written description compliance
simultaneously with claim construction in all cases where the
claim construction dispute hinges on the appropriate breadth to
be given to a particular claim term, would result in greater
consistency and efficiency.
D. THE STATUS OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AS AN ISSUE OF FACT
DOES NOT PROHIBIT ITS CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
With the Phillips Court having “left undisturbed [its] en
banc decision in Cybor,” the Federal Circuit currently treats
claim construction as pure question of law that is subject to de
novo review. As discussed above, this holding has been heavily
criticized for being inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Markman that claim construction is not a “pristine”
question of law, but rather one that requires the resolution of
underlying fact questions.
In addition, Cybor has been
criticized for the lack of deference afforded to the district courts’
claim construction rulings, given the amount of factual
evidence that district courts must consider during the claim
Cybor is widely regarded as
construction process. 174
undermining the Markman Court’s goal of uniformity, and has
instead led to uncertainty and unpredictability, with the
173. See supra Section II.C.
174. In his dissent in Cybor, Judge Rader denounced the majority for
turning a blind eye to the voluminous factual evidence that district courts
evaluate in connection with claim construction analyses:
trial judges can spend hundreds of hours reading and rereading all
kinds of source material, receiving tutorials on technology from
leading scientists, formally questioning technical experts and testing
their understanding against that of various experts, examining on
site the operation of the principles of the claimed invention, and
deliberating over the meaning of the claim language.
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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Federal Circuit reversing the district court on the issue of claim
construction in a substantial percentage of all cases on
appeal. 175
If the Federal Circuit corrects its mistake by reconsidering
Cybor – something that at least 8 out of 12 Federal Circuit
judges have suggested a willingness to do – the path will be
further paved for implementation of the proposal suggested in
this article. 176 That is to say, consideration of the written
description requirement, which is considered to be a “question
of fact”, would naturally fall within the set of fact questions
underlying claim construction.
With Cybor reversed or
substantially clarified, the Federal Circuit could then apply a
more deferential standard of review to the district court’s
finding on claim construction.
If, however, Cybor remains the law of the Federal Circuit,
and the Court continues to endorse the fiction that claim
construction is a purely legal issue, 177 district courts could
nonetheless simply consider written description compliance.
After all, Cybor, though flawed and largely unsupported by the
very judges who brought it to life, is technically good law today
and does not stand in the way of district courts’ consideration of
175. While the exact percentage is subject to some debate, most sources
agree that the percentage is significant. In Judge Rader’s dissent in Cybor, he
lamented the lack of predictability on appeal due to the high reversal rate,
noting that it “reverses more than the work of numerous trial courts; it also
reverses the benefits of Markman I. In fact, this reversal rate, hovering near
50%, is the worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher would provide
greater certainty.” 138 F.3d at 1476. See also e.g., Dan L. Burk and Mark
Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 53 (2005)
(“The Federal Circuit reverses roughly a third of the claim constructions
presented to it on appeal, a far larger percentage than its general reversal
rate. The idea of setting out clear boundaries to warn the public of what is and
is not claimed - the ‘notice function’ of patents that has received so much
attention in recent years - simply isn’t working.”) (citations omitted); Kimberly
A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2001) (finding that the Federal Circuit reverses
district court claim constructions 33% of the time). In a subsequent study,
Professor Moore reported that the problem of unpredictability due to high
reversal rate had not improved with time. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman
Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 231 (2005).
176. See supra Section II.B and accompanying discussion.
177. “While this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction
is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is plainly not
the case.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Lourie, J., and
Newman, J., dissenting).
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the written description requirement. In fact, after Phillips, the
written description must be considered, as it is “always highly
relevant” – and indeed, is the “single best guide” – to claim
construction. 178 Thus, if the approach advocated in this article
were adopted, district courts would continue to examine
evidence of the written description, but would do so from a
different perspective (i.e., with an eye towards whether the
patentee’s proposed construction, if adopted, would satisfy the
written description requirement). Moreover, it is important to
note that this approach would in no event require the district
court to make an affirmative ruling on noncompliance with the
written description requirement.
Therefore, even if this
approach was adopted, the Federal Circuit could continue to
review claim construction rulings de novo, with the question of
written description compliance being subsumed within the
legal operation of claim construction.
CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he [patent]
monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its
boundaries should be clear.” 179 Clarity is necessary “for the
protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive
genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the
patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.” 180 Without
it, “a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation
may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would
discourage invention . . . and ‘the public [would] be deprived of
rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what
it is that limits these rights.’” 181
Though clarity is “essential” to the proper functioning of
the patent system, the current system fosters obscurity through
the courts’ inconsistent and unpredictable treatment of the
written description during claim construction. While it may be
true that “there is no magic formula or catechism for
conducting claim construction,” there is significant room for
178. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
179. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
730 (2002) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 150 (1989)).
180. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)
(citing General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (U.S.
1938).
181. Id. (citation omitted).
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improvement of the current regime. 182
This article has
recommended an approach by which the patentee is required to
demonstrate, at the claim construction stage, that its proposed
construction for a disputed term would comply with the written
description requirement. This proposal represents a moderate
reform in the courts’ treatment of the written description
requirement, and would go a long way in upholding the quid
pro quo bargain underlying the patent system. In doing so, it
would promote clarity, predictability, and fairness in the claim
construction process.
This proposal is consistent with the constitutional and
statutory mandate that a patentee’s exclusive rights extend
only to inventive subject matter described in “full, clear,
concise, and exact terms.” Under current claim construction
practice, there is a “heavy presumption” that the patentee is
entitled to the “full breadth” of the “ordinary meaning” of a
claim term absent “clear disavowal” of claim scope or a contrary
definition of the term set forth in the specification. This
practice seemingly ignores the fact that the patentee is not
entitled to patent coverage for subject matter that was not
fully, clearly, concisely, and exactly described in the
specification. If the patentee’s written description of the
invention that it possessed at the time of filing falls short of the
“full breadth” of the claim construction that the patentee has
proposed, the patentee is not entitled to monopoly power over
that full breadth. Yet, current claim construction practice
allows the patentee to unfairly benefit from incomplete,
unclear, and imprecise descriptions of its own invention since
such descriptions are less likely to be construed to represent
unequivocal narrowing language.
Perhaps a more fundamental problem with the current
practice is its implication that a hypothetical person of
“ordinary” skill in the art would ever understand a claim term
to have an “ordinary” meaning removed from its meaning in
the context of the written description. Cases like Texas Digital
and its progeny, which advised courts to first consult dictionary
definitions when construing a claim in order to ascertain the
“the full range of its ordinary meaning,” fell prey to that line of
thinking. In those cases, the hypothetical construct of the
“person of ordinary skill in the art,” which was designed to
182. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324.
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provide a lens through which a court should read the claims,
has obscured the court’s analysis, rather than clarified it.
To be sure, the Phillips court expressly rejected the
approach taken in Texas Digital, confirming that the written
description is “always highly relevant” to claim construction
and is, in fact, the “single most important guide” to that
process. In doing so, the Court made it clear that the so-called
“ordinary meaning” of a claim cannot be discerned by treating
the claim as though it exists in a vacuum: “Importantly, the
person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim
term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the
disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent,
including the specification.” 183 As another 2005 Federal Circuit
decision explained, “[w]e cannot look at the ordinary meaning
of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the
ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and
the prosecution history.” 184 Indeed, a person of ordinary skill
in the art is already familiar with the general meaning of the
terminology used in the patent claims; the specific meaning of
that terminology is informed by the written description, where
the patentee has disclosed what was invented.
Still, Phillips could – and should – have gone further.
Recognizing that “there will still remain some cases in which it
will be hard to determine” whether a broad or narrow
construction is supported, the Phillips Court believed that
making that determination “in the context of the particular
patent is likely to capture the scope of the actual invention
more accurately than either strictly limiting the scope of the
claims to the embodiments disclosed in the specification or
divorcing the claim language from the specification.” 185
Requiring the patentee to show that its proposed construction

183. Id. at 1313.
184. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
185. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323-24. This approach is consistent with the
Federal Circuit recognition that “[t]he claims are directed to the invention that
is described in the specification; they do not have meaning removed from the
context in which they arise.” Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.2d 1347,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). As the Renishaw Court explained,
claim construction “can only be determined and confirmed with a full
understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to
envelop within the claim . . . [T]he claims cover only the invented subject
matter.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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satisfies the written description requirement would extend the
logic of Phillips, making it even more likely that the resulting
construction would align with the “actual invention”. This
approach would have particular utility in the more difficult
cases where it is unclear whether the full breadth of a
patentee’s proposed construction is supported in the written
description. In such cases, the scale would tip in favor of a
narrower construction – a reasonable result, given that
constitutional and statutory requirements demand clarity and
exactitude from the patentee in exchange for the “bundle of
rights” a patent confers.
Although “possession” of a patentable invention is less
concrete than the physical possession of tangible property, the
old adage “possession is nine-tenths of the law” should apply to
patents with equal force. Requiring the patentee to establish
written description support for its proposed claim construction
is simply a new approach to an old idea – namely, that the
patent grant extends only insofar as the patentee has upheld
its end of the bargain by describing, in “full, clear, concise, and
exact terms,” the invention it possessed at the time of filing.

